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ABSTRACT
The trade-off between inflation and taxation is analysed in a model with heterogeneity in nominal
debt holdings. This creates a political conflict among the electorate. As a benchmark we study a
"comple[ely representative" democracy, where more inequality leads to higher equilibrium
inflation. Extensions include a more realistic two-party nomination system and real money
balances in the utility function. Special attention is drawn to the sources of multiple politico-
economic equilibria. Finally, an explicit comparison with the capital-levy problem is made.
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1. Introduction
A major issue in the public finance literature concerns the choice between inflation and tazation.
The Ramsey rule says that given the amount of government expenditures, both sources of
revenues should be driven up to the point where they are equally distorting at the mazgin (e.g.,
Barro, 1979; Mankiw, 1987). This literature usually assumes a representative agent and, thus,
abstracts from potential redistribution effects of relying more heavily on one or the other form of
revenues.
In this paper, the choice between i~ation and taxation will be analysed in Ihe contezt of a
politico-economic model with differences among agents in their nontinal asset holdings. Once the
nominal return on these assets is detetTrtined and given the amount of government expenditures, a
political conflict arises. Rich agents prefer ordinary tazes rather than inflation as the main source
of government revenues, while poor agents prefer a high rate of inflation so that the rich
contribute relatively more to the required government revenues and a larger share of consumptive
resources is available for the poor.
The basis for redistribution by means of inflation is not limited to differences in public
debt holdings, but includes differences in all types of nominal asset holdings, whether it be public
debt, private debt or pension claims (insofar as they are not indexed). In reality, the importance of
nominal wealth is, among other things, demonstrated by the fact that almost all debt issues in the
industrialised democratic countries, private of public, are in nominal terms, a phenomenon which
still lacks an adequate explanation (e.g., see ttte contributions in Dornbusch and Simonson, 1983).
Although data on the distribution of nominal asset holdings are scarce, which is in particulaz the
case for comparable cross-country data, the figures in, for example, Smith (1988) show that the
shares in total bonds and cash holdings by the richest one percent of the U.S. population are
typically in the range of 104'o to 3096 or even higher. Similar figures in Avery, Elliehausen and
Kennickel (1988) from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances suggest that only less than 509ó of
nominal wealth is held by the poorer 909'0 of U.S. households. The few available data for other
(industrialised) countries (for example, France) suggest degcees of inequality of comparable
magnitude.
The approach put forward here fits well within the rapidly growing politico-economic
literature, which tries to explain differences in economic policy by explicitly modeling the political
incentives of policymakers (for an ovetview, see Persson and Tabellini, 1990). In most of this
work, however, inequali[y takes the form of differences in capital endowments, which makes it
interesting to investigate the politico-economic consequences of heterogeneity in nominal assetz
holdings and compare these with the consequences of heterogeneity in capital endowments.
Section 2 presents the basic version of the model. Also as a benchmark for further
extensions, Section 3 analyses politico-economic equilibrium for a democracy with "complete
representation", i.e. where each type of agent is represented by a candidate for government. This
situation implies the same policy outcomes as a"direct democracy", i.e. where the electorate
directly votes upon the policy mix. The equilibrium policy mix is unique and charaterised by an
inFlation rate which increases in the degree of inequality in society.
Two main extensions are put forward in the following sections. Because a more realistic
political structure would anly allow for a limited number of goverrment candidates, in Section 4
the analysis is extended to a two party system with nominations within each party. Although
maybe in rather crude way, other issues are allowed to play a role as well, because the existence
of the parties is motivated by the identification of inembers with their party on these other issues.
A priori, there is no need for any assumptions about the relation between membership of some
party and relative wealth. However, the location of the parties in tetms of the relative wealth of
their members has implications for the number of equilibria as well as their itnplied level of
inFlation. Convergence of the parties' policy platforms (in temu of the candidates' identities) and
uniqueness of the elected goverrtment is ensured if most of the parties' supports is located on
opposite sides of the median voter. This follows from the trade-off between nominating someone
with better possibilities of winning the elections and someone whose policy choices aze more in
line with those preferred by the majority of the party members. Thus, uniqueness of the elected
government and of equilibrium policy, is lost if there is too Iittle discrimination between the two
parties' supports in terms of the relative wealth of their members and if party identification is
relatively weak. Section 5 introduces the other main extension of the basic model. Money holdings
are endogenised by including real money balances in the utility function. Although the elected
candidate always represents the median voter, here there also exists a possibility for a multiple
equilibrium policy combinations (each characterised by a particulaz level of accumulated money
balances). When comparing the extensions of Sections 4 and 5 from a more general point of view,
one can thus distinguish two main sources of multiple equilibrium policies: multiple election
outcomes (each candidate implements his individually preferred policies once elected) and multiple
equilibrium levels of the tax base (optimal policy mix for a given type of government depends on
the accumulated tax base).
Section 6 addresses the welfare properties of the politico-economic equilibria and provides
an explicit comparison with the political economy of capital taxation (Persson and Tabellini,
1994). Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.3
2. A model of heterogeneity in nominal asset holdings
This section presents a model with heterogeneity in nominal debt holdings among private sector
agents (cf. Beetsma and Van der Ploeg, 1993). Although data on the distribution of nominal asset
holdings are scarce, in particular comparable cross-country data, recent work by, for example,
Smith ( 1988) and Avery, Elliehausen and Kennickel ( 1988) on U.S. microdata suggests that the
distributions of these asset holdings are extremely skewed. For example, the richest (in terms of
tota! net worth) percent of the population has a share in the range of at least 10`16 to more than
30Yb (depending ori the iiem and the period) in L`te value of total nominal asset holdings by the
population. Similar figures are reported for France (Kessler and Wolff, 1991) and Japan (Bauer
and Mason, 1992). Other typical characteristics of such data are the strong correlations among the
distributions of various wealth items (i.e., the rich members of the population not only hold large
shares of the stock of nominal wealth, but also of corporate stock, real estate, etcetera), as well as
the correlation between the distribution of income and wealth. Roughly speaking, the highest
income earners are also the most wealthy in the population. The income distribution, however, is
generally much less skewed than the wealth distribution (Bauer and Mason, 1992). These
observations suggest that a potentially interesting further step in the analysis of the trade-off
between inFlation and taxation would be to allow for heterogeneity in nominal asset holdings,
which, in particular, enables us to analyse the effects of political pressures for redistribution.
A few qualifications are in order. First, it is assumed that (private and public) debt is in
nominal terms, rather than indexed to the price level. This assumption may be motivated by the
fact that in reality most of the debt, both public and private, is in nominal terms, at least in
industrialised countries. This observation has not yet met a convincing answer in the literature
(e.g., see the con[ributions in Dornbusch and Simonsen, 1983). For government debt one reason
might be that the private sector interprets the indexation of debt as a signal of a reduced
commitment to a low inflation. However, most of the following analysis would go through if
agents differ in their holdings of indexed debt (cf. Calvo, 1988, Section t) and the government
chooses the optimal share of debt repudiation, which depends on the relative wealth of the agent it
represents. The second point is that one would like to allow for other types of inequality as well.
However, as the remainder of the analysis makes clear, this would add a great deal of additional
complexity to the model, since the conditions for a stable majoriry in the elections aze notottiously
restrictive if there is more [han one source of conflict (inequality) among voters (although, as
noticed above, the available data suggest that the various wealth items are concentrated with the
same groups in the population). Finally, we should address the observation that usually lazge4
amounts of nominal debt are held by institutional investors. To keep the analysis focussed we
abstract from the existence of such investors which do not exert direct political influence via the
electoral process anyway. Also, in reality, a high rate of inflation might have a significant indirect
effect on the wealth of those who hold large amounts of stock in institutional investment
companies.
The private sector consists of a continuum of agents. To make the point of the paper as simple as
possible, the only source of heterogeneity among agents are differences in nominal asset hotdings
(D). These consist of perfectly substitutable private and public single-period debt. Some agents
hold a lot of nominal debt, whereas other agents hold little or no debt, or may even be net
debtors, which is the case when their claims against the government fall short of the claims other
private agents have on them. Thus, the set of private agents can be described by a density function
p(D) on R and the total mass of private sector agents is normalised to unity.2
The implicit assumption is that, initially, agents have the choice between investing in
physical capital with an exogenous real rate of return p or investing in nominal assets. For agents
to be indifferent between both investment alternatives, the ex-post real interest rate,
r-pf,r`-~, (2.1)
should be equal to p, in equilibrium. This requires that the expected inflation rate, ~r`, be equal to
the actual inFlation rate, x, in equilibrium. For convenience, we assume that all individuals invest
an equal amoun[ (normalised to zero) in physical capital and the remainder in nominal assets.
An individual agent, say i, faces the budget constraint
C; - Y~- (1 tr) D; - T- S, (2.2)
where C„ Y, D„ T and S denote consumption, pre-tax income, nominal debt holdings, taxes and
seigniorage extracted by the government for individual i, respectively. Individuals obtain utility
from both private and public consumption. Utility of individual i is given by
z One way to motivate the presence of heterogeneity in nominal debt holdings, is to assume that agents
live for two periods and differ in their first-period income, while second-period incotne is equal across
agents. Under suitable restrictions on utility and if nominal debt is the only available type of asset, the
distribution of first-period income is preserved in the nominal debt holdings individuals carry over into the
second period. Sce also Section 5.5
U; - C; t G, (2.3)
where G 10 denotes the exogenous per capita level of goverrtment spending.
The government must finance its primary level of spending plus intere.st payments and
repayment of outstanding government debt through the extraction of tax and seigniorage
revenues'.
G t(ltr) D" - T t S, (2.4)
where D" denotes the average amount of nominal assets held by individuals. If D"-0, the stock
of outstanding government debt is zero (i.e., there is no outside debt) and nominal claims among
private sector agents cancel out completely. The government budget constraint then reduces to
G-TtS. For convenience we assume that D"z0, excluding the situatiott where the goverttment
is a net creditor against the private sector."
The condition for eyuilibrium in the goods market is
C"tG-Y, (2.5)
where C" denotes the average level of private consumption.
The quantity [heory of money is adopted so that the demand for real money balances is a
constant proportion, say m, of outputs:
MIP - m Q, (2.6)
where M, P and Q denote per-capita nominal money balances, the price level and the non-
' The government is assumed to be responsible for both fiscal and monetary policy, which corresponds
to the situation of a dependent central bank. Although recently a number of countries have attempted to
make [heir central banks independent, in practice it tums out that no central bank is completely immune for
pressures (rom the govemment, not even the Bundesbank (witoess the course of events around the German
unification).
' The situation where the govemment is a net debtor is rnost realistic. Allowing for D`CO in the
analysis is straightforward, but dces no[ yield much additional insighl.
' Excluding money holdings by agents (m-0) dces not have any qualitative effect on the results. The
reason for including exogenous money holdings here is to enable me to more clearly contrast the results
under thc often adopted quantity theory assumption with the results that obtain if money holdings are
endogenous (Section 5).6
dis[ortionary per-capita level of output, respectively. It follows that the rate of inflation is equal to
the mone[ary growth rate, that is r-APIP-{r, where p3AM1M, and that seigniorage extracted
from an individual is given by S~p(M1P)-xtnQ. In the following, the inflation rate is assumed
to be directly controlled by the government.
The non-distortionary level of output, Q, is exogenous and there are output losses azising
from taxation and infla[ion. More speciftcally, pre-tax income is assumed to be given by
Y- Q I1 - h~(t) - hz(A)~, (2.7)
where t-TIQ denotes the (non-monetary) tax rate and hi(t) and hz(x) denote distortionary losses
from taxa[ion and inflation, respectively, with the properties h,'(.)~0 if t~0, hz'(.)10 if r10,
and h,"(.), h2"(.)10. Thus, the non-distortionary tax and inflation rate are assumed to be zero. As
in, for example, Obstfeld (1991), hz(x) captures the reduction in production efficiency often said
to accompany a rise in inflation.
3. Democracy with complete representation
In this section the political system is assumed to be a democracy with complete representation.
This term is used to contrast the situation in which each type of agent is represented by a
candidate for government (in the sense that, once voted into office, this candidate chooses his
policies so as to maximise the utility of this type of agent) with a two-party nomination system
studied in the next section." The elected candidate for govetnment is the one who beats each of
the other candidates in a majority contest.
The timing of events is as follows. In stage 1, all nominal debt is issued and the nominal
interest rate is determined. In stage 2, elections take place and a candidate is voted into office.
Finally (stage 3), the elected government chooses the inflation rate, r, and the tax rate, t, subject
to its budget constraint. The politico-economic equilibrium is then solved by working backwards.
Suppose that the elected govetnment type is d, hence its objective is to
max~,. ~l - hi(U - hz(r) f(lfpfa`-x) (d - d")I
subject to g f(1 fpf ~r`-a) d" - t f x m and given ar`, (3.1)
' The rype of an agent is defined as his nominal debt holdings and the type of a govetnntent (candidate)
corresponds to the debt holdings of the agent he represents.where a` is the expected inflation rate embodied in the nominal interest rate when debt is issued.
The strict concavity of the objective function and the linearity of the constraint ensure a unique
optimum. Using the first-order conditions, the optimal inflation rate, ir, follows from
h,'[gf(1 fpfr`)d"-x(mfd")1(mtd") - h2'(á) - d-d". (3.2)
The properties of the distortionary loss functions imply that x strictly decreases in d(keeping
everything else fixed), which means that the poorer the agent represented by the government, the
higher the inflation rate. An increase in the (predctermined) nominal interest rate, ~, increases
the total value of government commitments and, thereby, requires a higher tax ra[e and a higher
inFlation rate. Moreover, an increase in ~ increases the total amount of govemment cortunitments
that is fixed in nominal terms, but not in real terms, hence increases the marginal revenue from
inflationary taxation, which causes, ceteris paribus, a substitution away from ordinary taxes
towards inflationary taxes. On net, the effect of an increase in ~` on the inflation rate is positive,
whilst the effect on the tax rate is ambiguous.
Given the policy choices t and ir by a type d government, indirect utility of some agent i,
with debt position d;, is
u, - 1- h,(~) - hZ(ir) f(lfpfa`-x)(d~d"). (3.3)
hence,
au;lad - {h,'[g-F(1~-pfa`k1"-~r(mfd")](m-~d")-h2'(ir)-(d;-d")}(air~ad). (3.4)
Combining this with (3.2) yields au;~aá-o if d-d;, au;~a~l~o if dcd; and au;~aáGo if d1d;.
Hence, individual preferences are single-peaked in the candidate type, while an individual's most
preferred candidate type increases monotonically in his own wealth [eq.(3.3)]. Therefore, the
decisive vote is cast by the median debt holder and [he chosen goverrunent is of type dM. Denote
its policy choices by superscript "M" and note that, although ~ and tM (hence welfare also)
depend on x`, the election outcome does not depend on ~r`, because the nominal interest rate is
predetermined when elections take place.
The final step is to solve for the equilibrium policy outcomes using the assumption that the
private sector rationally anticipates the election outcome and the policy chosen by the new
government. Imposing ~`-x"', equilibrium inflation, ~E, follows fromx
h ,(gf(1 }P~"-,~M.~) (mtd") - h,'(~'E) - dM~". (3.5)
For a given distribution of nominal debt, hence given dM-d", the unique equilibrium inflation rate
increases in the amount of outstanding government debt, d". More interestingly, a ceteris paribus
inc~rease in ineyuality (i.e. dM falls for given d"), implies a higher equi[ibrium inflation rate (hence
also a higher nominal interest rate) and a lower equi[ibrium taz rate.
For most of what follows (in particular Section 4), 1 specify
hl(t) - ~iiK~tZ ánd tl2(7r) -~iK2A , K~, KZ i Q, (3.6)
which implies for the equilibrium inflation and tax rate, respectively,
,rM.L - ~K~m(mfd")fKrl ~ lKl(mtd")[St(IfP)d") f (d"-dM)}, (3-7)
tM.E - rK~m(mfd")fKZ~ ~ lK2~Bt(1 fP)d"1 - (d"-dM)m}. (3.8)
4. Two-party nomittation systems
Although the assumption of complete representation (i.e., the most preferred candidate type by the
median voter is available for government) underlies much of the work in the politico-economic
literature, in real world democratic electíons usually there are only a(very) limited number of
candidates, who represent different political parties. This makes it interesting to investigate how
the political trade-off between inflation and taxation is affected when representation is less than
complete. In this section, this trade-off is analysed within the context of a two-party system with
nomina[ions in each party. The reason for introducing nomina[ions into the model is that they are
a cortunonly observed phenomenon in democratic party systems, for example the United
States.'" To keep things as simple as possible, the analysís will be restricted to a situation with
' Even in tnany instances where the nomination process is less explicit and visible than in the United
States, in putting forward their candidates, panies face a trade-off be[ween enhancing the chances of
winning the elections and nominating a candidate whose policy pre(erences aze more in accordance with the
preferences of most of the party members. This trade-off will be highlighted in the sequel of this section.
' Aldrich (1980) analyses a model which focusses on the influence of campaign resources on the
dynamics of U.S. nomination processes.9
two parties, with given sets of inembers characterised by their relative nominal wealth
holdings."'o Party members are individually rational in their voting behaviour, both when
nominations and the govemmental elections take place." Nominations take place between the
issue of debt and the general elections. Otherwise, the timing remains unaltered.
Denote [he two parties by "p" and "s". Party p(party s) has P (S) members labeled according to
their relative amounts of debt holdings, dp,, C.. G dP,P (d,,i G.. C d,~. For convenience, each party
member is assumed to be a candidate for nomination, and P and S are assumed to be odd. Hence,
the median type d~,M in party j (j -p,s) is unique. Throughout we assume that do.M ~ d,,M, so that
sometimes we will informally refer to party p as the (relatively) "left-wing" party and to party s as
the (relatively) "right-wing" party.
The existence of these parties is motivated by assttming that some agents care about issues
other than the trade-off between inflation and taxation. These issues could refer to the parties'
positions on social issues, but also to differences in the preferred composition of govertunent
spending. For example, if a candidate of party p came to power he might choose an alternative for
exogenous government spending g which is valued higher by members of party p than by
members of party s, and vice versa.'~ This is formalised by asstuning that all members of party p
(party s) experience an additional increase in utility of ap (a,) if party p's (party s's) candidate is
elected as president and is able to follow his preferred policy on these other issues. Other
members of society are indifferent about these other issues and do not join a party.
This set up ímplies that the relative weight of party members in the voting population is
infinitesimal and, therefore, avoids potential strategic complications from the interaction between
the parties' nomination processes and the general elections. This is not unrealistic, because party
membership is usually rather limited.
9 Allowing for more than two parties would require an explicit treatment of the government formation
process (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Baron, 1991, 1993) which follows the elections if a party is
not able to attract enough votes to form a govemment on its own. Allowing for such complications would
be beyond the scope of the present paper.
'o Aldrich (1983) presents a model with spatial preferences and two parties. In the model there is
interaction between the policy platforms adopted by the parties and the set of voters who are prepared to
become activist of one or the other party. Hence, the parties' platforms and their memberships are jointly
and endogenously determined.
" Unlike most of the literature (e.g., Alesina, 1987, 1988; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Baron,
1991, 1993) here parties do not act unitarily, nor are their members interested in winning per se, but rather
in the policies implemented by the elected government candidate (Wittman, 1977, 1983).
1z An ezample is the choice between investing a given amount in roads or railways.10
Suppose that members of type dP and d, (dpGd„ for convenience) have been nominated by party
p, respectively party s. Their policy choices, when chosen into office, are calculated as in Section
3(eq.(3.1)]. Indirect utility of some agent i(with debt position dJ, ifd~ (j-p,s) is in power, is
u;~ - (lfpi~~-a~(d;-d") f 1 - ~ftK~I~r- thK2zi~, (4.1)
where (x;,t~) is the policy mix chosen by d~. Because (u;,pu;.,) is strictly monotonic in (d;-d"), party
p's candidate is elected if and only if uM,PuM,,10 (where uM~ is indirect utility of the median debt
hoider in the electorate if d~ is in poweP}, 1-ience if and only if
I YV~M I G I df-dM I I~ (~i.2)
So far, nothing has been said about how the parties' nomination procedures actually work. We
assume that both parties' candidates are nominated simultaneously by majority rule by the party
members. Nomination by majority rule may capture an essential element of how nominations
work in reality, because parties often try to signal their democratic intentions by handling their
internal affairs democratically (at least to a large extent).'o
Before solving for the nomination outcomes, the following definitions are given:
Definition 1: For party j(j-p.s):
(a) (d)~' is the type of the poorest member of party j, with debt holdings greaterthan d.
(b) (d)~ is the type of the richest member of party j, with debt holdings less than d.
(c) (d)~~ is the member type in party j closest to d.
Definition 2: d` - 2dM - d.
" This follows from the quadratic specification of the loss functions and [he resulting linearity of the
policy choices (~r;,t,) by agent d~ (j-p,s) in his relative wealth. The result in (4.2) conform the assumptions
in most of the work on spatial voting theory (e.g., see Enelow and Hinich, 1984), where policies are
represented by points in Euclidean space and policy preferences are (symmetricafly) decreasing in the
distance to the most preferred policy. The relation of the curreni model with models of spatial voting should
be clear noting that there is a one-to-one mapping from agent type to preferred policy mix. Given the
government budget contraint, preferences about the inflation rate (or the tax rate) can be spazially
represented on a line and are sytnmetric about the most preferted inflazion rate.
'a An alternative procedure would be to nominate the candidate who maximises aggregate (or average)
consumption of all party members (given the candidate nominated by the other party). Qualitatively
speaking, this yields essentially the same results.ll
Let Dp-{dp.~....dp.r}, Dp`-{d`(dp.l),..,d`(dp,r)}. De-{d~.~,..,ds} and D,`~{d`(d..l),-.,d`(d.s)}. For
convenience, the intersection of the sets DPUDp` and D,UD,` is assumed to be empty.
Definition 3: A nomination equilibrium is a pair of candidates {dP ,d;}, such that, given the
candidate d; of party s, candidate dp' of party p is chosen by rnajority rule, and vice versa.
The assumption that both parties' candidates are chosen simultaneously effectively rules out the
possibility of strategic voting behaviour of party members during the nomination process.
Proposition 1 gives the nomination equilibtia for a broad set of configurations of the parties'
supports, the party medians and the median of the electorate:
Proposition 1: nomination equilibria under in,finitesimal parryidenti~cation (ao-a,-e 10):'S
(a) Let dp M G d, ; and dM G min[d, ,,(d,.; t dp p)12J.
(i) If d`(d„)G dp M, the nomination equilibria are {dp M,d,,,}, .., {dp M,d,s}.
(ii) If d`(d,;))dpM, the set of nomination equilibria is {(d`(d,,,))p', [i-1,..,S ~
d`(d, ;) )(d`(d, ,))~]}, provided party p has a member d`(d,,,) Gdp~ c d, ,.
(b) Let dp.M GdM G d,.M and let ~(dM)p-dM ~ G ~ (dM)s'-dM ~'
(I) lf ~ dpM-dM ~ G ~ (dM),~-dM ~, the nomination equilibria aze {dpM,d,,}, .., {dpM,d,s}.
(ii) If ~(dM)p-d" ~~ ~(dM);-dM ~, the set of nomination equilibria is {[i-1,..,P ~ dp;GdM
and d`(dr.i)G(dM),']. (dM);}-
(I11) Let ~(dM)p--dM ~ G ~(dM),-dM ~.
(l) (f ~((dM),)p-dM ~ G ~(dM),'-dM ~, the set of nomination equilibria is
{[i-1,...P ~ d`((dM).})Gdp.iG(dM)~], (dM)~}.
(2) If ~((dM);)P-dM ~ 1 ~(dM),'-dM ~, the set of nomination equilibria is {(dM)o,
lt - 1.--,S I((dM)~ )p G d~.i G d`(((dM)~ )p )J}
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (a)(i): Take an arbitrary candidate d,' ED,. Since d`(d,.,)Gdp,M,
d`(d;) G dp M. Any candidate of party p poorer than d`(d,7 will lose the elections, while any
candidate (strictly) between d`(d,) and d,' will win. We have to show [hat, given party s's
candidate d;, dp.M is the candidate of party p chosen by majority rule. Note, however, that single-
peakedness of indirect preferences has been lost for some members of p. Yet, it is possible to
show that there exists a stable majority. To this end, it is sufficient to show that whcever is the
alternative, dp,M is preferred by at least haff of party p's support. First, consider an altetnative
" f is an azbitrarily small positive number.Iz
candidate d~ of party p, such that dP' G d`(d,~ or dp' ~d,'. Then, all members of party p of type
5dr M(a majority) prefer dP M to dp'. The reason is that dp would lose the elections against d,',
while d~,M would win. All members of party p of type Sdp,M prefer [he policy mix of a type dp,M
government to the policy mix of a type d,' government. Next, consider an alternative candidate
d`(d,') G dP G dy M. Because both d~ and dp.M would beat d; in the general elections, all members
of p of type zdpM(a majority), prefer dP,M. Finally, consider some d~ , such that dP,M G dy' G dP,P.
Then, all members of p of type 5 d„M(a majority) prefer dP,M. Hence, given an arbitrary
candidate d; of party s, party p nominates dpM. To complete the proof, suppose that party p
nomínaees d,,,M. As no candidaie of party s can win the elections, party s's members are indifferent
about whom to nominate.
Part (a)(ii): Consider a candidate d,' of party s such that d,' z(d`((d`(d,.,))P));. If
d`(d,') Gd~ M, then, by previous arguments, party p nominates dP' - dp,M. If d`(d,')~ dP,M, party p
nominates dy'-(d`(d,'))p`5(d`(d,.~))p`. To see this, consider an alternative candidate of party p,
say d~,', such that dP' G d`(d,') or dP'1 d,'. Then, all members of party p of type Gd`(d,'), a
majority, prefer (d`(d,'))p'. Similazly, if (d`(d,'))p`GdP'Gd,', all members with wealth less than
d`(d,') prefer (d`(d,'))P' to dr,'. Given the response dp' of party p to candidate d,' of party s, we
calculate now the response d; of party s to dP'. By the previous arguments, if d`(dP')~d,,M,
d,~-d,M, while if d`(dP')Gd,.M, d,Z-(d`(dP'));. Since do'1d`(d,'), d`(dp')Gd,', and hence d,'Gd,'.
Similarly, we can find par[y p's new response dPZ~dP'. This process converges to the stable
combination {(d`(d,,))p',(d`((d`(d,,,))P)), }. To complete the proof, consider a candidate d,' of party
s such that d,., 5 d,' G(d`((d`(d,,,))P )); . By previous argtunents, party p's response to d,' is
dP'~(d`(d,'))p'-(d`(d,,,))P'. Given party p's candidate dP', any candidate d; of party s would lose
the elections.
Part (b): The proof is omitted, because it is quite long and detailed, but straightforward by
the arguments used in the proof of Part (a). The detail stems from the lazge number of possible
configurations. o
Part (a) deals with the situation where the location of party p is biased towards the median voter.
When the parties' supports do not overlap, d" G(d, , fdp p)I2 is the relevant constraint, and when
there is a limited overlap, dM G d,,, is the relevant constraint. The case where party s is relatively
biased towards dM is symmetric. Some configurations covered by Part (b) have already been
covered by Part (a). The main differences aze that Part (a) allows for a wider variation in the
position of dM at the expense of additional constraints on the location of the parties' supports,
while Part (b) constrains dM to be located between the parties' medians, while at the same time13
allowing for a wider overlap of the parties' supports. Cases where ~(dM)P~M I) I(dM),'-dM I
are symmetric to those considered in Part (b).
Proposition 1 shows that convergence of the parties' platforms (i.e., convergence of the
types of their nominated candidates) goes further than the panies' own medians if these medians
are located on either side of the median voter in society and each party has a potential candidate
closer to the median voter than the other party's own median. Platform convergence is highly
debated in the political and the politico-economic literature (e.g. see Alesina, 1987, 1988; Alesina
and Spear, 1988; Harrington, 1992).16" Loosely speaking, if the support of party p is biased
towards the median voter, by nominating a candidate as close as possible to dM, party s forces
(through a decentralised mechanism, i.e. each party member's voting behaviour is individually-
rational) party p to move their candidate in the direction of the support of party s, which
eventually makes all members of party s better off. In a sense, platform convergence reflects the
trade-off between delegating a candidate whose individually-rational policy choices better reflect
those preferred by the rnajority of [he party and a candidate with better possibilities of winning the
elections.
Although for some configurations considered in Proposition 1 a multiplicity of nomination
equilibria exists, the candidate type which eventually wins the government elections is uniquely
determined. Thus, one has
Corollary l: Let party identification be infinitesimal (~P-a,-e~0). Let (i) dy,MGd,,~ and
d" G min[de.l,(d..i fdr,N)I21 . (tt) ~D.P G~.M ánd dM ~ maXldp.P.(d~,I f..P.P)I2~, Oi (lll) ..D.M G dM ~ d,.M'
(a) The elected goverrtment type is uniquely determined.
(b) The equilibrium policy mix (hence also the nominal interest rate) is unique.
Part (b) follows by combining Part (a), the result that the elected candidate does not depend on the
" While in, for ezample, Alesina (1988) precotnmitment or repeated interaction (to build up reputation)
between the two parties is a prerequisite for convergence, because the policy convergence is time-
inconsistent, here convergence is the result of the nomination process within each of the parties.
" The traditional spatial model (Downs, 1957; Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970), in which
candidates are office-seeking (i.e., solely concemed with winning the elections), candidates adopt identical
platforms (i.c., the position most preferted by the median voter). The robustness of this prediction has been
investigated by many researchers. Calvert ( 1985) allows candidates also to be policy-0riented and allows for
unccrtainty about voters' responses, Cox (1985) studies the effects of differences in the electoral formula,
Palfrey (1984) and Feddersen, Sened and Wright (1990) allow for party or candidaze entry, while Bazon
(1991, 1993) analyses the effects of coalition fotmation on the convergence of platforms. However, once the
assumption of office-seeking candidates is relaxed, the robustness of the convergeace resul[ is quite
dependent upon the specific model that is employed.l4
numinal interest rate anJ Uie strict monotonicity of his individually-rational policy choices as a
function of the nominal interest rate.
Too ntuch parry diffusion may lead to multiple equilibrium policies:
For all configurations of parties and median voter type considered so far, the equilibrium policy
mix was unique, because the elected government type was uniquely determined. This is not always
the case, however. Consider the following example:
Example 1. Multiple equilibrium po[icy mixes. Let pany identification be infinitesïmal
(aP-a,-e10). Consider a configuration where dMGd~.MGd,.M, party s has a member d,' such
that dM G d,' cdPM, and party p has a member dP"-d`(d;)P cdM. For convenience, let
(d;),' 1 d`(d~). For this configuration, the set of nomination equilibria includes {d`(d,~P ,d;},
which implies a government of type d,'CdPM, and the set {dP.M, [i-l,..,S ~ d,.;Gd`(d~,M) or
d,~1dPM}}, which implies a government of type dP,M.
To confirm this claim, consider first the pair {d`(d;)P,d,'}. Given that d,'GdPM would win the
elections, every member of party p is indifferent between d`(d,~P and any alternative candidate
who would lose the elections. Moreover, any candidate able to beat d,', say dP', leaves all
members of type ? d,,M (a majority) worse off (because dP"c d; G dP.M). From party s's point of
view, given that (d;),' ~d`(d~), any candidate 1d,' or G dP' would imply a goverttment of type
dP, leaving all members of s of type ?d,,M worse off. Moreover, although any alternative
candidate in the interval (dP',d;) wins the elections, the same majority ?d,,M would be worse off
again. Finally, similar arguments confirm that {dP,M, [i-1,..,S ~ d,,;cd`(dP,M) or d,.;1dp,M]} is a
subset of the set of nomination equilibria.
Example 1 suggests that more "diffusion" in the parties' locations is conducive to the
multiplicity of electoral outcomes, hence equilibrium policy outcomes. Parties find it more
difficult to distinguish themselves from each other on the issue (the inflation rate or the tax rate)
which is relevant for the electorate. Note that agents' inflationary expectations, as embodied in [he
nominal interest rate, are irrelevant for the possibility of multiple electoral outcomes and,
therefore, multiple equilibrium policy mixes.
lncreasedparty identiftcation leads to policy uniqueness and platform convergence:
For the case of infinitesimal party identification (aP-a,-e~0), all configurations have now been15
characterised in terms of their equilibria. Situations where (í) dPMGd,., and
dM G min[d,.l.(ds.l f"P.P),Z]. (11) ~.M 1~9.P ánd dM i máxl(d~.l f"D.P),2,~P.P], OC ( In) ..P,M G dM G~.M,
yield unique equilibrium policies, while situations where d,,, G dP.M or d,,M Gdp,P may or tnay not
yield uniyue equilibrium policies.
So far, party identification has only played a very limited role. However, for at least two
reasons it is interesting to see how our previous results are affected if party identification is
stronger than infinitesimal. First, party identification is an important (empirical) issue in the
literature (e.g., lacoby, ; Miller, 1991). Secondly, (although maybe in a rather crude way) we
want to assess the role of other potential issues in studying the choice between infiation and
taxation. The role of party identification is summarised by:
Proposition 2: EJj`ects of an increase in party identification (apa~.
(a) Let (i) dP.M G d, ,, dM Gmin[(d,., tdP P)12,d,.,] and party p have a member d`(d,,,) G dP~ G d,.,,
or (ii) let d,,M ~ dPP, dM ~max[(d,., tdP P)12,d1,,P] and party s have a member
dP P G d,,; Gd`(dP P). Then, the set of nomination equilibria is unaffected by an increase in aP
or a,.
(b) For any configuration of the parties' supports a combination of critical values (ap,a,')
exists, such that for aPZ ap and a,z a; the chosen government type and, hence, the
equilibrium policy outcome are uniquely determined. The elected govemment type
minimises the distance to the median of the winning party, under the restriction that the
former's type is closer to dM than any of the member types of the other party.
The proof of Part (a) is straightforwazd. For the proof of Part (b), suppose that the
element in DPUD, closest to dM is a member of party p(the case of thís element being member of
party s is completely symmetric). Let dP' and d; be defined such that d;E D, minimises ~ d,.;-
dM ~(i-1,..,5) and dPEDP minimises ~ dP,;-dP.M ~(1-1,..,P) under the restriction that ~ dP'-
dM ~ G ~ d;-dM ~. We show that the complete set of nomination equilibria is {dp,
[j-1,..,5 ~ argmin{ ~ dP,-dP,M ~ s.t. ~ dP.;-dM ~ G ~ d,,y-dM ~}-dP`]}, which implies a unique
government type, hence a uniyue equilibrium policy mix. First, we show that each element of this
set is indeed a nomination equilibrium. Denote by S, the subset of inembers d4,, (j-1,..,5) of D,
such that argmin{ ~ dP,;-dPM ~ s.t. ~ dl,,,-dM ~ G ~ d,~-dM ~}-dP'. Given d;ES„ we can distribute
the alternative candidates to dP' into those who yield a electoral victory for party p and those who
yield a victory for party s. For the latter group of candidates a majority of party p is worse off if
aP is large enough. From the former group, choose some altelnative, say dp". By definition of dP',I6
~ dr ~"dv.M ~~ I do "dp,M f. Hence, if do"-do,M ~0, all members of p Sdo.M (a majority) are worse
off under dP~. Similarly, if dp'-dP,M G 0, all members of p zdp.M (a majoriry) are worse off under
dp~. Finally, given dp', members of party s are indifferent about their candidate. The second step
is to show that nl! nomination equilibria are in the set mentioned. Take a member d,' E D, of party
s. l3y the arguments just used, for n~ large enough, in response, dp' E Dp is chosen as
argmin;{ ~ d~;dr,M ~ s.t. ~ dr ~dM ~ G ~ d,'-dM ~}~ f21. If d,' E S„ d~ -d„' and members of party
s are indifferent about their new candidate. If d,' ~ S„ do' ~dP since S, contains a[l members of
party s such that argmin;{ ~ dr;dPM ~ s.t. ~ d,,,;-dM ~ G ~ d,~-dM ~}-dP. Given that dp'~dP',
~ dp'-do,M ~ G ~ dF -dr,M ~, since dP' minimises ~ dp;-dPM ~ under fewer restrictions. But then, by
definition of dy', there exists a d,ZED, which beats dp' in the elections. Since ~ dp'-dM ~ G ~ d,'-
dM ~ and ~ d,Z-dM ~ G ~ dP'-dM ~, ~ d,z-dM ~ G ~ d,'-dM ~. This process converges to the set of
nomination equilibria mentioned. o
Part (b) confirms the main point of the discussion around Example 1. Stronger
discrimination between the two parties' supports vis-à-vis the median voter or better alignment of
the interests of party members (through increased party identification), reduces the possibility for
multiple equilibrium policy outcomes.
5. Endogenous real money balances
One way to endogenise money holdings is to include real money balances in the utility function,
which can be motivated by the savings on transactions services. This may lead to multiple
equilibrium policy mixes.
First, an individual, say i, simultaneously decides about money (MJ and debt (DJ holdings, given
his (exogenous) endowment income, E;. Thus, the government issues both money and public debt,
the proceeds of which are spent on public goods (other [han g), which, for convenience, do not
enter agents' utility. The price level at debtlmoney issue date is normalised to unity. As before, in
stage 2 elections for a new government take place, while in stage 3 the new government's policy
choices are implemented, after which consumption takes place. Utility of agent i is now given by
U;-C,fB(LJfG, where L;-(1-A)M; is the level of real money balances at the moment
consumption takes place and after the chosen policy mix has been implemented. Function B(.) is
twice differentiable with B'(L)~ 0, if LZ 0, and B"(L) G 0. Hence, marginal utility from real
money holdings is decreasing.17
Hence, the problem of the new govemment becomes:
max,.~ {1 -h,(t)-h2(~r) -4. (Ifpf~r`-r)(d-d") t B[(1-r)M]IQ}
s.t. g~- (lfpt~-r) d" - t-F r m" , given r`, (5.1)
where M and d are money, respectively debt, holdings chosen by an agent of type É, while m"
are average real money holdings M" normalised by Q. The optimal money growth rate, ir, follows
implicitly from,
h,'[gt(l fpt~r`)d"-á(m"fd")1(m"~-d") - h2'(á) - m"B'[(1-á)Ml - d-d". (5.2)
Given the properties of B(.) and given kl, the left hand side of (5.2) is monotonically increasing in
ir. As before, the inflation rate is higher, if the agent represented by the government is poorer.
Denote indirect utility of agent i under government d by ti;. The analog of (3.4) is:
au;lad - {h,'[g~-(Ifpfa`)d"-ár(m"-F-d")1(m"fd")-h2'(à)-(d;-d")-m"B'((1-~r)M]}(8á~8d).(5.3)
Using (5.2), one has that u; is increasing for d Cd;, decreasing for d 1d;, and reaches a rnaximum
for d-d,. Again, in a completely representative democracy, the elected candidate is the one
preferred by median voter and his type is dM. If distortionary losses are quadratic, i.e. h,(t)-'fxK,t2
and hZ(t)-'~íK2u2 (K,,K210), and B(.) is quadratic over the relevant range, i.e. B(L)-B,fBZL-B,L2
(B2,B3 1 0 and such that B2IB, 1 L for relevant values of L), voters' indirect preferences are
symmetric about their most preferred government type. In that case, any of the results on two-
party nomination systems continues to hold without any modifications. For the remainder of this
section, however, we assume that the political system is a completely representative democracy.
In the first stage, the problem faced by agent i is to choose M; in order to tnaxitrtise:
C,fB(L;)tG s.t. C, - Yf(lfp)D~T- Yf(lfp)(E,-M;)-T-rM; and L;-(1-~r)M;. (5.4)
where xM; is the inFlation or seigniorage tax paid by i on his real money holdings and collected
by the government. In (5.4) we have used that future policy is correctly anticipated by the rrtarke[
(since the market anticipates correctly the type of the new government, and its incentives for
inflation). For agent i the first-order conditions yield18
(1-x)'(lfptx) - B'IU-~)M~, (5.5)
Hence, each agent chooses the same level of money holdings (henceforth, we drop superscript
"A" for average money holdings), which implies that the initial distribution of endowments is
preserved in individuals' debt holdings.





mEe,~(1-.~M.r.)Mr~ - dM-0". (5.(i)
(1-~M.l:)-I(Í-Fpi-7rM.E) - Brr(1-~M.E)ML~. (5.7)
where m` -MtiQ. System (5.6) and (5.7) can be complicated and depending on the specification
of B(.), one might have zero, one or multiple equilibria (see also Calvo, 1988). However,
irrespective of the number of equilibrium solutions {ME,xM~E}, the type of the elected goverrtment
is uniyue and represents the median wealth holder.
6. Equilibrium welfare comparison and comparison with the capital tarzaNon problem
Let us first consider [he basic situation where money balances are exogenous. Denote equilibrium
tax and inflation rates by t'' and FE, respectively. Because agents are rational (hence a`-A~), in
eguilibrium no redistribution is possible. Equilibrium welfare (consumption) of some agent i(with
debt position d;) is
1 ~ (1 ~P)(~~d") ~ ~~K~(tE)Z - f~KZ(~e)2' (6.1)
Therefore, a Pareto-optimal equilibrium is one where total distortionary losses are minimised,
given primary government spending, g, and outstanding government debt, d". This equilibrium
can be attained if the new government's policies can be committed somehow (for example by its
predecessor). The optimal policy under precommitment (indexed by superscript "P") is
tP - (KIm2-~K~ ~ K2~g}(1 }Pl""l,
(6.2)
x" - (K~mZ}KZ) ~ K~Igf(1fP)d"lm, (6.3)
This is also the optimal equilibrium discretionary policy combination of a government of type19
d~ ~ d" t(K~InjfK2) ~ KIK2[gt(I f-p)d"]d" ~ d". if d"70. (6.4)
Such a candidate is "more conservative" than the "average candidate", d", a by now fatttiliaz point
first stressed in Rogoff (1985) and extensively discussed by Persson and Tabellini (1990) within
various contexts. Here the intuition is that, although the average candidate has no incentive to use
inFlation for the purpose of redistribution, he still has an incentive to use inflation in order to
lower the real debt service costs on the stock of outstanding government debt, d".
Because distortionary losses are quadratic and the equilibrium discretionary policy choices
are unique and lïnear in the relative wealth (d-d") of the agent represented by the goverrtment, for
all agents equilibrium welfare is higher, the smaller is ~ d-dP ~[to see this, replace dM with d in
eqq.(3.7) and (3.8)]. More specifically, this implies for the politico-economic equilibritun in the
basic model version with complete representation that equilibrium welfare is lower for a[l agents,
the higher is the degree of inequality, d"-dM 10, ceteris paribus. Because debt holders anticipate
that the new government has stronger incentives to redistribute if inequality is stronger, they
demand a higher nominal interest rate, so that in equilibrium no redistribution is possible. In fact,
if debt is renewed afYer the elections, dP will be the uniquely elected government type and the
Pareto-optimum is attained.'A The reason is that the nominal interest rate still has to be
determined, while the electorate takes into account that, in equilibrium, the goverrtment will not
succeed in redistributing wealth anyway.
Including real money balances in utility alters the results for the basic model as follows.
Rather than corresponding to the minimisation of the distortionary losses, the commitment
equilibrium now amounts to solving (5.1) under the "credibility" constraint, a2-x, and the first-
order condition (5.5). The existence of a candidate type (analogous to dP in the basic situation)
compatible the commitment policy mix as the unique discretionary equilibrium policy mix, is no
longer ensured. This implies that altering the timing, so that elections precede the choice of debt
and money holdings, no longer guarantees that the Pareto-optímum is attained. A candidate type
for which the commitment policy is a possible discretionary equilibrium outcome, may also be
compatible with different equilibrium policy mixes, the realisation of which depends on the
expectations x` incorporated in the nominal interest rate.
'e For this alternative timing to be compatible with attainment of the Pareto optimum, it thus is
necessary that there exists a unique discre[ionary equilibrium associated with a government of rype dP. This
is the case in the basic version of the model. Beetsma (1994) discusses this uniqueness issue in a related
model.Zo
Comparison with the political economy ofcapital taxation (Persson andTabellini, 1994):
At this point it may be useful to make a more explicit comparison with Persson attd Tabellini
(1994), who artalyse the political economy of capital taxation under direct and representative
democracy, and under commitment and discretion." Their framework is a two-period model
with agents who differ in their endowments, hence in their investment possibilities. [n period 1
investment decisions are made, while in period 2 the labour-leisure decision is made after which
taxes on capital and labour are paid. The tax rates are decided upon either by direct voting
("direct democracy") or by electing a candidate for government, who then makes his individually
optimal choices ("representative democracy"). Commitment corresponds to the situation where tax
rates are determined in period 1, before any individual decisions are rnade, while discre[ion
corresponds to the case where the tax rates are detertnined after the investment decision has been
made, but before thc leisure decision is made.
The comparison with their model highlights a number of interesting points. First, the
difference between direct democracy and representative democracy becomes important if private
sector decisions have to be made between the election date and the new government's policy
decisions. As in our basic model, in their model, if the representative is chosen after investment
decisions have been made, then his type is that of the median debt holder and the policy outcome
is the same as under direct voting. Accordingly, while in their model the representative no longer
coincides with the median voter if investment is chosen after the elections, in our basic model this
is no longer the case if debt issue takes place between elections and the choice of the policy mix.
A second point concerns the possibility for multiple equilibria. Contrary to our basic model
version but conform the extension with money in the utility function, in absence of policy
cornmitment, the model of Persson and Tabellini generally leads to multiple equilibria. The reason
is the presence of an accumulable tax basis (capital in their model; money holdings in the current
model), which is fixed at the moment that taxes are determined. Given the government's need for
revenues this opens the possibility for the ccexistence of "low base, high tax rate" and "large
base, low tax rate" equilibria.
Finally, [he main difference with the current model is that in their model, the real (- after
tax) return depends on the government to be chosen, while in our model it is fixed, because the
gross (- nominal) return changes one for one with the anticipated type of the new government,
i.e. with his ex post incentive to inflate away the real debt value. This has two important
implications. First, while in our model redistribution is not possible in equilibritun, in their model
'~ Persson and Tabellini (1990, chaptecs 6 and 7) present a wmprehensive overview of this problem
under the representative agent assumption.21
redistribution is possible in equilibrium. The second and related implication is that while in our
model commitment is Pareto superior to discretion, in their model a Pareto ranking between
cornmitment equilibria and discretionary equilibria (in which capital is accumulated) may fail. In
particular, the extremely poor (in terms of initial endowments) may be better off in a discretiortary
equilibrium.
7. Conclusions
This paper studied the political economy of the trade-off between inflation and taxation in the
context of a model with heterogeneity in nominal asset holdings. Given the nominal interest factor
on outstanding debt, poor agents prefer a relatively high rate of inflation, while wealthy agents
prefer a low rate of inflation. Therefore, in our basic model version of a completely representative
democracy, where the median voter's preferences are pivotal, the unique equilibrium inflation rate
increases with the degree of inequality as measured by the difference between average and median
debt holdings. Extensions of the basic framework are a two-party nomination system with less
than complete representation and the introduction of real money balances in the utility function. In
particular, these extensions shed light on the source of a potential multiplicity of equilibria. For
the former extension, when there is a strong diffusion of the parties' supports (so that the
electorate finds it difficult to discriminate between the parties) and party identification is weak, the
elected government type may not be uniquely determined. Uniqueness is ensured if party
identification is strong enough. Including money in the utility function does not affect the result
that the median government type is elected, yet may be conducive to a multiplicity of equilibrium
policy outcomes for this median goverrunent type.
A few points need some further discussion here. First, the possibility of international debt
was not explicitly considered here. There are two major ways of issuing debt to foreigners:
issuing debt denominated in domestic currency or debt denominated in some foreign currency.
The former is relatively more important for the rich and industrialised countries and is studied in
Beetsma (1994). Qualitatively speaking, the results in this papet are not affected by introducing
international debt denominated in domestic currency. In faet, the incentive of the government to
inflate away the real value of debt held by foreigners is strengthened, because foreigners are not
part of the domestic electorate, and, by reducing the value of debt held by foreigners, ordinary
taxes can be further reduced for the agent represented by the government. The situation where
debt is issued in foreign currency can be analysed with an analogous extension of a model with
differences in real debt holdings (as noted in Section 2), where the shaze of debt that is repudiatedz2
(see Calvo, 1988) is chosen by majoríty rule. Of course, further complications might arise, such
as a potentially reduced borrowing capacity afrer an open debt repudiation has taken place. The
second point concerns the assumption that differences in nominal wealth are the only source of
inequality, while income was assumed to be constant, so that potentially redistributive effects of
income taxes were neglected. Therefore, an interesting extension of the analysis in this paper
would be to allow for inequality both in debt holdings and in income, which provides a
framework for studying the trade-off between inflation and income tax as instruments for
redistribution. The main complication with such an extension is the existence of a stable majority
when elections are introduced. However, the figures for the U.S. in Kessler and Wolff (199I,
table 5), for example, show that net wealth (i.e., after subtracting liabilities from gross wealth) is
highly concentrated with the high income groups, while, in addition, the concentration of the
various wealth items, including nominal wealth, seems to be highly positively correlated. This
suggests that a high income tax or a high inflation [ax may (roughly) hurt the same groups in
society. Nevertheless, even if the same groups are hurt both by a high inflation rate and a high
income tax rate, such an extension would still be wortwhile, because it might shed some light on
the potential trade-off between taxing that base for which inequality is stronger and taxing that
base for which distortionary losses are lower. However, this is left for future research.
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